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Abstract 
 
In order to scale up, the Serbian legislator should not bother with unlicensed NGOs or 
unlicensed commercial company lending. Instead, the legislator should concentrate on 
removing legal and regulatory obstacles which impede scaling-up the microfinance industry 
through the formal financial sector. These obstacles relate to collateral pledging, compulsory 
reserves with the National Bank, foreign exchange positions, high costs of court registration 
taxes and similar. Also, the Central Register of pledges as well as Credit Dossiers for 
companies, entrepreneurs and individuals should be introduced. The addressing parties to 
these issues are the National Bank of Serbia and the Ministry of Finance as well as other 
competent state authorities which are in charge of the commercial law reform. 
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I. The background 
 
 
The explanation of the microfinance1 demand lies in the previous decade and a half. The 
Serbian economy has been devastated during the last decade of the 20th century. Today, 
officially 33% of the population is unemployed, but in reality, this figure is even larger2. Due 
to the ongoing process of economic restructuring and privatization of previously state owned 
companies, there is a continuous downsizing of labor force, which will even more increase the 
unemployment rate and lead to further impoverishment. Ideally, this labor force would find 
their employment within the small and medium-sized enterprises sector or within micro-
enterprises. The above parameters point out to the importance of micro financing in Serbia, 
not only for the economic, but also for the social and political development in Serbia. 
Gradually, the Serbian policymakers have realized that microfinance can be a vehicle to 
overcome such problems and increase employment. 
 
Fifteen years ago, one third of the population did not live in poverty and in some sense Serbia 
had a functioning "middle class". Also, there was a very large growth of micro and small 
business during the Markovic reforms of 1992, but then the numbers stagnated and declined 
due to the wars and lack of reforms3. For that reason, in addition to adhering to the "old poor", 
the objective is also to tailor the project for the "new poor" in the attempt to recapture or 
reclaim the development which has already existed. 
 
Today there are only four Microfinance organizations4 (MFIs) covering the population of 8 
million. The existing MFIs, without bank microcredits, have covered around 10.000 clients 
and thus the microcredit market is unsaturated. 
 
 
For comparison, in Bosnia, on the population of 3.5 million, there are 42 MFIs, 
with a 365 Mio Euro annual turnover and 61.000 active micro loans. 
 
 
There is one Greenfield microfinance bank in Serbia (also one in Montenegro) and some 
commercial banks are involved in the downscaling process, which have covered around 
20.000 clients. All these players they have not covered all the potential clients and there is 
vast space for attracting expanding the industry. 
 
In order to satisfy the plurality of needs of microfinance clients, a pluralism of institutions and 
tools for their achievement should be considered. The recent regional study examining the 
state of microfinance in the SEE region5 shows that there is not one best institutional form of 
MFI that does best on all parameters. There are a lot of reasons to allow the full range of 
                                                
1 The CGAP “Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance” (www.cgap.org) define 
microfinance as the provision of banking services to lower-income people, especially the poor and the very poor. 
2 Information from the Serbian Ministry of Labor and Employment as of May 2004. 
3 For detailed numbers see the World Bank report for the donor community for 1999 and 2000 
4 The Microfinance Gateway (www.microfinancegateway.org) defines MFIs as organizations that offer financial 
services to the very poor. Gradually the term MFI has come to refer to a wide range of organizations dedicated to 
providing these services: NGOs, credit unions, cooperatives, private commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions and parts of state-owned banks. 
5 Forster Sarah, Greene Seth, Pytkowska Justyna, 2003, “The State of Microfinance in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the New Independent States, MFC/CGAP” 
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institutional forms appropriately regulated given their role. Experience will show which one 
of them will survive. 
 
This paper will focus on policies and regulation and recommendations on what the 
Government and NBS needs to do to scale-up the industry. It will: A) Describe the existing 
status quo and explain why not to bother with unlicensed NGOs or unlicensed commercial 
company lending, B) Question if the remaining vehicle under the Serbian law is where the 
action is, C) Point out barriers for specialized microcrediting banks, and D) Analyze whether 
commercial downscaling is an option. The conclusions will outline what could be the legal 
and regulatory obstacles to remove which would scale-up microfinance in Serbia. 
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II. The existing status quo 
 
 
• There are four types of microfinance actors in Serbia 
 
• The demand for microfinance has not been satisfied yet and there is a playing 
field for new actors 
 
 
This section will discuss what the existing status quo on microfinance in Serbia and the 
existing institutional actors. In the beginning of the findings, it is necessary to mention that 
Serbia does not have regulations on Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) laws governing 
specifically microfinance. The NBS has actively resisted such a decree due to their concern 
over proper supervision and the potential development of Ponzi schemes6. The issuing of 
micro loans is governed by existing banking regulations. Similarly, Serbia does not have a 
law on NGOs, and thus the existing Serbian MFIs have been registered as “Associations of 
Citizens” under the valid legislation. On the other side Montenegro, the second constitutive 
unit in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, does have microfinance legislation, that is, 
the: “Decree on Micro Finance Institutions”7, issued by the Montenegrin Central Bank, as 
well as the “Law on NGOs”. In Serbia, there is however a draft “Law on Microcredit 
Organizations” created with the Serbian Microfinance Policy Working Group with the support 
of experts from the Microfinance Center. 
 
When mentioning that there is no specific microfinance legislation, one may ask how are the 
existing MFIs in Serbia operating? The Serbian MFIs have created a Strategic partnership 
with the Commercial Banks. Micro Development Fund and MikroFins (two of the four 
Serbian MFIs) commission their funds to commercial banks which issue the micro loans. The 
MFIs asses the potential clients and bear the risk of loan loss. The commercial banks are only 
paid a fee for the service and legally act as a Commissioner for the MFIs8. In addition, MDF 
has also devised a guarantee deposit scheme but is in the process of abandoning due to an 
unfavorable arrangement with the respective commercial bank. Supervision in these case is 
satisfied since the commercial banks are supervised by the Serbian National Bank. These 
schemes are acknowledged by the governmental authorities more as an alternative solution for 
providing microfinance, than some new legal framework for microcredit operations. 
 
On the other side, World Vision (the third of the four Serbian MFIs) applies the Guarantee-
Deposit model. Technically World Vision deposits its funds into a Guarantee Fund operated 
by the bank. In this model the Bank is the lender and WV is the Guarantor for the credits, 
along with keeping its role of technical advisor. This scheme is legal according to the valid 
Serbian regulations, but is a little more expensive for the MFI. In all these cases we see a 
strategic partnership between MFIs and FFIs, which enables the provision of microcredit in 
Serbia. 
 
                                                
6 National Bank of Serbia, October 2001, “Letter of the NBS Vice Governor to the Serbian Ministry of 
Economy” 
7 The “Decree on Micro Finance Institutions”, (Official Gazette of RM no 1/2003) 
8 A similar approach is the Company Service Model devised by Accion International. The NGO works as a for-
profit service company to the bank, doing the marketing and credit evaluation of the client and the loan 
collection, but the loan is booked on the bank and the bank’s MIS is utilized, as well as its branch structure. 
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The fourth MCO, Integra is involved in group lending to women and has issued 
approximately 100 credits so far. 
 
 
 
The major advantages of the strategic MFI - FFI partnership are the following: A) It 
provides a legal framework for MFI operations; B) It opens possibilities for further 
access to capital; C) It is easily applied, although it includes increased expenses. 
The major problems in the strategic MFI - FFI partnership are the following: A) 
Bank’s policy, which creates a dependency on the bank, i.e., the bank may 
unilaterally increase the interest rate; B) Bank’s conditions, i.e. depending on the 
banks conditions, it may not be possible to disburse all the funds. For instance, in the 
arrangement of the Micro Development Fund with one of the local banks, the bank 
required a 18% compulsory reserves of the portfolio, which therefore, MDF could 
not distribute to beneficiaries; C) Increased expenses, which influence the MFIs 
sustainability; D) Duplication of administration, i.e. both the MFI and the bank create 
a database of clients containing the same information; E) Time consumption occurs 
when the a) administration is duplicated, b) client’s are informed about the 
reimbursements, and in the c) actual travel to the bank. 
 
 
 
When making a proposal for scaling-up9 microfinance in Serbia, one of the key policy issues 
is do we need to introduce new microcredit organizations or can we satisfy the need with the 
existing institutions, such as the Savings Credit Cooperatives, Savings Credit Organizations, 
Savings Banks and the Commercial banks? 
 
 
A) Why not bother with unlicensed NGOs or unlicensed commercial company lending? 
 
There is a general discussion as to whether NGOs should or not be the champions of 
microfinance. Opponents argue that banks should be the ones disbursing the loans, rather than 
NGOs. NGOs with their inability to take commercial equity and deposits and thus operate as 
banks are largely dependant on donors, and once the donor input dries out, NGOs have no 
more sources of financing. Furthermore, through NGO microfinance, the beneficiaries are not 
supported to act in an entrepreneurial-like behavior and are not trained to develop their 
business. Finally, the non-commercial behavior of NGOs can on the long run, negatively 
impact the banking sector. On the other side, proponents argue that the banking sector will not 
suffer since most of the MFI clients anyway cannot meet the banking requirements. 
 
An important policy issue is the duration of NGOs which provide micro credits. The idea is 
that their mission would be completed once they have facilitated growth and replaced by other 
commercial institutions. To that purpose, one can argue that the NGO lending should only be 
permitted for some "limited time" to make certain that a faux market is not created and 
                                                
9 Scaling-up means MFIs that NGOs are transformed into formal financial institutions (FFI), and besides 
offering loans expand to a number of other services such as micro-leasing, micro-insurance, savings, housing 
loans etc. Lieberman, Djankov et al. propose three groups of recommendations for NGOs going formal: 1) Ease 
operating constraints on the existing MFIs; 2) Examine and change the existing banking regulations to encourage 
small firms' lending; 3) Avoid state-sponsored financial intermediation. See Djankov Simeon, Lieberman Ira, 
Mukherjee Joyita, and Nenova Tatiana, April 2002, “Going Informal: Benefits and Costs”, World Bank 
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sustained for the country's poor with the result that the poor are ghettoized and de facto denied 
any hope of entering the power structures within a country. 
 
Another role of NGOs in increasing the access to financial services is creating databases and 
track records of clients. Through client's databases, NGOs providing microcredit can assist 
that previously un-bankable clients to come into the formal financial sector. 
 
There is a realistic and existing need to expand the existing microfinance market in Serbia. 
Having in mind that the Serbian Parliament is very slow in promulgating laws (for instance, 
the new Bankruptcy or VAT laws have waited two years for their enforcement), it is unlikely 
that the eventual introduction of a new NGO law and a Micro Credit Organizations law will 
meet the realistic time requirements. On the other side, it is questionable whether the 
traditional microfinance schemes as developed in Bangladesh and India, or the neighboring 
Bosnia are the best solution for Serbia? Can microfinance be merged with formal banking and 
the development of the microfinance sector be combined with the restructuring of the banking 
sector in Serbia? 
 
 
 
An EU country - France has amended the banking law so that Associations (MFIs) 
can on-lend to clients, but only from their own funds. The French Law on New 
Economic Regulations, which modifies articles of the Monetary and Financial Code, 
now allows “non-profit associations delivering loans for the creation of the 
development of enterprises by unemployed people, on their own funds and on loans 
borrowed from credit institutions, to deliver credits10. This means that, under certain 
conditions, a “microcredit association” will now be allowed to borrow and lend. 
 
 
 
This paper argues that NGOs should not be the appropriate form of MFI for Serbia. NGOs do 
not have the adequate legal framework and it would take too much to overcome the regulatory 
and legal obstacle. 
 
The policy in Serbia is hostile to NGOs for the following reasons: 
 
1. Some influential Serbian policymakers misunderstand NGO MFIs and fear that they 
could threaten the clean-up of the mainstream financial sector; 
 
2. NGOs are late in the game to be regularly developed into MFIs in Serbia; 
 
3. Although NGOs are typically the vanguard for microfinance, in Serbia this is not the 
case as it is for instance in Bosnia. 
 
To conclude, the current legal and regulatory conditions are unfavorable, as are the chances 
for education of the misinformed policymakers. They represent a significant obstacle. The 
lobbying extravaganza with the NBS will not have anything to do with microfinance policy. 
Too much time and effort will be wasted without any result. 
 
                                                
10 For more details check www.european-microfinance.org The European Microfinance Network 
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Unlicensed commercial company on-lending does not exist as a form of microfinance in 
Serbia. Since the NBS does not allow for NGO on-lending, for the same reasons (i.e., 
misunderstanding of the risks involved) it will not allow for unlicensed commercial MFIs on-
lending. 
 
 
B) Savings Banks 
 
So far there is only one Savings Bank - Opportunity International, which has been registered 
in Vojvodina. The registration process did not go smoothly and it has required lobbying 
extravaganza, which is not possible in the case of other NGOs or other organizations which 
wish to register a saving bank. Although the savings banks provide a regulated vehicle for 
operating microfinance in Serbia, they have their disadvantages which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. In this sense, Opportunity International Savings Bank has a limited scope of 
work in Serbia and on the long run is looking to register as a full fledged commercial bank. 
 
 
C) Greenfield microfinance banking 
 
The only Greenfield bank registered in Serbia is the ProCredit Bank. It started under the name 
of Micro Finance Bank as an IMI initiative for SEE and CIS countries. Now ProCredit Bank 
is operating in a number of neighboring countries and is expanding its activities. After three 
years from the initial investment, ProCredit Bank has already become profitable. This bank is 
specialized in microcredits and its disbursements are highly overcoming the disbursements of 
the existing Serbian MCOs. For instance, on a monthly basis, ProCredit bank disburses 
around 2.000 loans. From the beginning of its operations, until now, PCB has disbursed a 
total of 22.000 loans. All of these loans are below 10.000 Euros and thus fit into the 
microcredit criteria (the statistics does not include consumer loans). 
 
 
 
In Montenegro, Opportunity International is registered as a full fledged bank under 
the name Opportunity Bank in 2002 and is successfully providing microcredits. OB 
started as an NGO in 1999 and so far is the only example of a scaled up microfinance 
bank. 
 
 
 
The performance of Greenfield microfinance banks so far show their capacity to grow in a 
short period and cover bigger portions of the client market then do the traditional MCOs. This 
is especially the case with both ProCredit bank and Opportunity International. Such a success 
shows that either these are the models to pursue in microfinance development, or perhaps that 
the success of ProCredit and OB is a result of the fact that they were the first to enter the 
market hungry for micro loans. The authors’ opinion is that the first option is true, but it is 
also true that the adequate timing has influenced the commercial success. 
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D) Downscaled Commercial Banks 
 
Opening Greenfield banks specializing in microfinance and downscaling the existing and 
economically viable banks are two parallel processes currently ongoing in Serbia. LFS 
Financial Systems is performing the task of downscaling in Serbia together with KfW of 
Kulska, Eksim, Komercijalna and Zepter banks. According to their findings, from some 
aspects it is easier to start a Greenfield bank then to downscale the existing commercial banks. 
On the other side, downscaling has its advantages towards Greenfield banking. Furthermore, 
the downscaling of banks has advantages as it will consolidate the banking sector in Serbia. 
Namely, in 2003 Serbia had 46 banks on the population of 8 million, and in the beginning of 
2005 it has 39 banks. However, both downscaled banks and Greenfield banks are subject to 
the same restrictive banking regulations in Serbia.  
 
 
E) The impeding regulatory and legal policies 
 
So far the existing regulatory and legal policies of the Serbian government have constrained 
the development of the Serbian MFI sector. This impediment has been supported by the 
conservative feature of the Serbian law and misinformed attitudes of relevant policymaker. 
 
I) The official standpoint of the NBS is that MFIs, which are traditionally institutions that are 
unregulated by prudential legislation, may contribute to the destabilization of the financial 
sector11. This fear was supported by the experience from the early 90ties of the previous 
century when a number of pyramidal schemes and financial frauds have occurred. The 
Serbian legislator oversaw the fact that microfinance seldom accounts for a large enough part 
of a country's financial assets to pose serious risk to the overall banking and payments 
system.12 
 
 
 
For instance, Montenegro has 650.000 inhabitants. It has a much smaller 
economy then the Serbian one but they have undertaken a radical turn. 
The Montenegrin Central Banks has enacted the “Decree on Microfinance 
Institutions”13 and thus legalized microfinance operations. This radical 
turn did not have an effect to destabilize the financial sector in 
Montenegro.  
 
 
 
II The NBS has the discretionary right to license (or not) all legal forms of FFIs. This 
practically means that the NBS does not even need to bother to justify its refusal of a license 
on policy grounds (as it had done when it first refused a license to Opportunity International). 
If proposed, any of the other vehicles under the banking law, have to confront this significant 
obstacle that exists, unless the banking law were changed to require objective grounds for the 
refusal of a license.  
 
                                                
11 National Bank of Serbia, October 2001, “Letter of the NBS Vice Governor to the Serbian Ministry of 
Economy” 
12 See CGAP “Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance” (www.cgap.org) 
13 “Decree on Microfinance Institutions”, (Official Gazette of RM no 1/2003) 
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III) The foreign exchange positions of the NBS impose restrictions of the open currency 
position. This means that banks engage only in dinar lending, which is indexed to foreign 
currency. This feature will be discussed more in the chapter on open issues with the 
policymaker. 
 
IV). The NBS imposes burdensome reserves which decrease the on-lending portfolio of 
banks. So far they are 21%, with the promise of NBS that they will be lowered to 18%. The 
rationale of reserves is protection of depositors and they are regulated by prudential 
legislation. 
 
 
 
The neighboring Romania was a tough partner in promoting microfinance. 
The banking sector was overregulated due to the Romanian’s legislator to be 
in compliance with Basel 2 recommendations14. Among the difficulties, 
were the 40% hard currency reserve requirement, burdensome reporting, 
limitations on employing branch managers, etc. Gradually, microfinance 
was installed into the system, and is now operating smoothly. This was a 
result of a lobbying effort which was based on Romania’s wish to enter the 
European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 The Basel Capital Accords 
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III. Are the existing FFIs in the Serbian law vehicles  
where the action lies? 
 
 
• The existing FFIs do provide a mechanism for microfinance, but these vehicles 
are burdened with demanding registration requirements and extensive reporting 
 
• So far, not one of the existing MFIs have scaled up into an FFI 
 
 
This section argues whether the existing vehicles under the Serbian law are where the action 
lies for scaling up microfinance. So far there are four MCOs (Micro Development Fund, 
MicroFins, World Vision and Integra), one Savings Bank (Opportunity Savings Bank) and 
one Greenfield microfinance bank (ProCredit Bank). Other forms of organizations which are 
regulated in the Serbian law, such as the Savings Credit Cooperatives and Savings Credit 
Organizations have not been used for microfinance so far. This section will analyze each of 
the existing FFIs, highlight their restrictions and offer possible changes to make them more 
attractive to microfinance.  
 
 
A detailed review of the Serbian regulations related to microfinance has 
been made by Lyman and Lauer, and the intention of this paper is not to 
duplicate the already existing, but to mention the latest changes and point 
out to new legislation, internal NBS decisions and regulations. See Lauer 
Kate and Lyman Timothy, April 2002 “Survey of the Legal and Regulatory 
Environment for Microfinance Institutions in the Republic of Serbia”. 
 
 
 
A) Savings Credit Cooperatives 
 
So far Savings Credit Cooperatives15 (SCC) are the closest formally regulated institutions 
which can serve as a vehicle for issuing microcredits. There are approximately 10 SCC 
registered in Belgrade. The obstacles for SCC’s to become a vehicle for microfinance are the 
following: 
 
1. Very restrictive conditions for registration which include a big portion of conditions 
requested for banks, 
2. Shareholders organization of SCC which the complicates ownership, 
3. No tax reductions and other alleviations, 
4.  As SCC are profit oriented, the question is in which scale would the donors contribute 
with their resources, 
5. Registration requirement of 200.000 Euros, 
 
The issue in this case is whether the state can provide alleviations for SCC which plan to go 
into microfinance activities. The issue for potential investors in the field is whether they can 
                                                
15 Articles 72 to 75 of the Serbian “Law on Banks and other Financial Institutions” (Official Gazette of RS no 
72/2003) 
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adjust to the above requirements and consider this form for their microfinance programs? So 
far, due to the above obstacles Micro Development Fund is not considering going into this 
direction. MicroFins is considering going formal in the future, depending on a number of 
issues and in that case, the SCC would be the preferred form of FFI they would chose. 
 
 
B) Savings Credit Organizations 
 
A similar form to the SCC are the Savings Credit Organizations16 (SCO). Originally, SCOs 
were conceived as organizations of large state corporate systems and used for financing the 
employees of such systems. In addition, the MFIs have not considered them as an option for 
their scaling up due to similar restrictions as foreseen for the SCC's and also the registration 
requirement of 1.2 Mio Euros. In case of depositing such a significant amount, a Savings 
Bank would be a better solution which would in addition provide a larger scope of 
microfinance activities. 
 
 
C) Savings banks 
 
So far only OI has registered itself as one of the FFIs and chose the form of a Savings Bank17. 
Following this example, World Vision is considering scaling-up to Savings Bank. As 
mentioned before, this form has its obstacles, and the following are the main ones hindering 
access to financial services: 
 
1. Permission to on-lend only to private persons and not to enterprises.  
 
As such, all micro loans issued by SB’s are treated as consumer loans for reporting 
purposes. Nevertheless, this does not represent an obstacle for increasing access to 
financial services, since from the aspect of NBS, issuing consumer loans requires less 
paperwork as explained in the chapter before. 
 
2. Inability to take deposits in foreign currency, but only in dinars.  
 
3. Inability to take credit lines from abroad, which are by default in foreign currency. 
 
Nominally a SB would look for additional financing from abroad to increase its on-
lending portfolio, so this legislative requirement represents a restriction to accessing 
finance. 
 
4. Permission to be involved in monetary transfers in the Serbian monetary market only 
in dinars and not in foreign currency. 
 
For the time being, this restriction does not handicap SB’s especially, since their 
primary goal would be issuing credits and not performing monetary transfers. 
 
 
                                                
16 Articles 68 to 71 of the Serbian “Law on Banks and other Financial Institutions” (Official Gazette of RS no 
72/2003) 
17 Articles 64 to 67 of the Serbian “Law on Banks and other Financial Organizations” (Official Gazette of RS no 
72/2003) 
 15
5. Ownership 
 
Savings Banks in Serbia should be owned by a local company. In practice this does 
not represent a problem for registering. Namely, shareholders can purchase a local 
company which can serve as an investment tool. 
 
In this sense, SB’s have a limited scope of work in Serbia. For this purpose, Opportunity 
International is on the long run is looking to register as a full fledged commercial bank. 
 
 
D) Greenfield banking 
 
In Montenegro, Opportunity International is registered as a full fledged bank under the name 
Opportunity Bank in 2002 and is successfully providing microcredits. OB started as an NGO 
in 1999 and so far is the only example of a scaled up microfinance bank. 
 
The only Greenfield bank registered in Serbia is the ProCredit Bank. It started under the name 
of Micro Finance Bank as an IMI initiative for SEE and CIS countries. Now ProCredit Bank 
is operating in a number of neighboring countries and is expanding its activities. After three 
years from the initial investment, ProCredit Bank has already become profitable. This bank is 
specialized in microcredits and its disbursements are highly overcoming the disbursements of 
the existing Serbian MCOs. For instance, only in April 2004, ProCredit bank has disbursed 
2.000 loans. From the beginning of its operations, until now, PCB has disbursed a total of 
14.000 loans. All of these loans are below 10.000 Euros and thus fit into the microcredit 
criteria. Of course, all consumer loans are excluded from this statistics. 
 
The performance of Greenfield microfinance banks so far show their capacity to grow in a 
short period and cover bigger portions of the client market then do the traditional MCOs. 
Therefore, they should be taken into account as an important and expanding actor in the field 
of microfinance. 
 
Opening Greenfield banks specializing in microfinance and downscaling the existing and 
economically viable banks are two parallel processes currently ongoing in Serbia. LFS 
Financial Systems is performing the task of downscaling in Serbia together with KfW. 
According to LFS findings, from some aspects it is easier to start a Greenfield bank then to 
downscale the existing commercial banks. On the other side, downscaling has its advantages 
towards Greenfield banking. However, both downscaled banks and Greenfield banks are 
subject to the same restrictive banking regulations in Serbia, and their obstacles for 
microfinancing will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
E) Serbian Microcredit Fund 
 
End of February 2005, the Serbian Finance Minister has announced the establishment of the 
Serbian Microcredit Fund. The loan size would be from 5 to 20 thousand Euros, maturity 
from 3 to 5 years, and annual interest rate of 1%. The estimated fund portfolio is 8 Mio Euros. 
This represents a radical shift of the government towards microcredit. However, the loan size 
is significantly larger than it is in a traditional micro loan. 
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The question with this fund is how will it affect the microfinance scene in Serbia? Will it 
distort the financial market and kill the existing four MFIs. Will it with its small interest rate 
distort loans from banks? 
 
The second question is the sustainability of this fund. It is hardly possible for a fund with a 
1% annual interest rate to be economically sustainable on the long run. Therefore, this fund 
will most probably be filled in from the state budget or other means of financing. 
 
So far, the Ministry of Finance is closed to dialogue on this issue and relate to press releases 
and public announcements on the issue, which provide insufficient information. 
 
 
New banking law in Serbia 
 
In March 2005, the NBS Governor has announced a new banking law to be promulgated in 
200518. This may represent a unique opportunity to promulgate new provisions which will 
facilitate microfinance in Serbia. Besides, the new banking law should facilitate the reform of 
the banking sector, allow new foreign banks to enter the market with new investments and 
facilitate the restructuring / privatization of the existing state owned banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Presentation at the occasion of the inauguration of the White Book, organized by the Foreign Investors 
Council (FIC) in March 2005 
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IV. Barriers for specialized micro crediting institutions 
 
 
• Commercial banks have to handle heavy handed regulation 
 
• Tough and burdensome requirements on uncollateralized lending require 
prohibitive reserve requirements 
 
• The legal and regulatory barriers relate not only to banks, but to all other FFIs  
 
 
Below are the representative types of prudential and non-prudential19 regulatory barriers 
which influence microfinance development in Serbia. 
 
An additional problem is that regulations relating to microfinance are stipulated in a number 
of laws and by-laws and it is hard to find one's way in the forest of regulations, i.e. NBS 
decisions. 
 
 
A) Registration requirements 
 
The National Bank foresees a number of requirements for registering banks and other 
financial organizations.20 Below is the list of requirements with brief explanations: 
 
a. Authorization for the person with whom the NBS will cooperate in the process upon 
the request for issuing a license; 
b. Contract on establishing the bank; 
c. Statement from the local founder that the financial resources for the founding capital 
will be paid to the temporary account with the bank, or the statement of the foreign 
founder that the hard currency resources will be paid to a separate account with the 
NBS; 
d. Evidence that the founder of the bank will transfer non-financial resources to the 
founding capital of the bank; 
e. Evidence on the origin of foreign investment; 
f. Evidence on the existence of reciprocity, which means a confirmation of the 
competent body or excerpt from the legislation of the country of the foreign founder 
which proves that subjects from Serbia and Montenegro are allowed to establish banks 
on the territory of this state; 
g. Proposal of the banks’ statute; 
h. Proposal of the decision for issuing the first emission of the bank’s shares; 
i. Information necessary for establishing the solvency of the founder; 
                                                
19 CGAP's “Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance” describe the difference between 
prudential (devised for the protection of depositors) and non-prudential regulation of microfinance. Prudential 
regulation issues are the: minimum capital, capital adequacy, unsecured lending limits and loan loss provisions, 
loan documentation etc. The non-prudential regulatory issues are the: permission to lend, consumer protection, 
fraud and financial crime prevention, credit reference services, secured transactions, interest rate limits, 
limitation of ownership, management, and capital structure, tax and accounting and feasible mechanisms of legal 
transformation which in effect is scaling-up.  
20 “Decision on the mode for implementing articles 8, 9, 10a, 12, 15, 19b, 19e, 28, 29 and 59 of the Law on 
banks and other financial organizations”, (Official Gazette of RS no 129/04) 
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j. Information on relations among the founders; 
k. Names and recommendations for the proposed members of the managing and 
controlling board of the bank, and for proposed persons with special authorizations 
and responsibilities; 
l. Program of the bank’s work for the period of five years and the proposal for the basis 
of business policy of the bank for year in which the bank is being established; 
m. Information on qualifications of the bank’s staff for performing the tasks from the 
contract and the documents on business policy; 
n. Information on the technical qualifications of the bank for performing the tasks from 
the contract and the documents on business policy.   
 
Other financial institutions regulated under the Serbian law have to submit all of the above 
foreseen documents, except for requirements from the above points 3, 5 and 6.  
 
 
B) Reporting requirements  
 
The National Bank imposes reporting requirements for banks and other financial 
organizations on: a) balance sheets, b) income statement, c) cash-flow, and d) changes in the 
capital21. 
 
The balance sheet contains information about liabilities and off-balance positions. 
 
The income statement contains information about: a) income and expenses of regular 
business, b) irregular income and expenses, c) profit and loss before tax, d) income tax, and e) 
profit and loss after taxation. 
 
The cash flow report contains information about payments and collection of payments in cash 
and cash equivalents through the giro account, current and hard currency account, including 
compensations, assignations, assignments made through these accounts in accordance to 
International Accounting Standards and other relevant standards. 
 
The report on changes in the capital contains the following information on balance and 
changes: a) shares, b) emission premium, c) registered and unpaid capital, d) the bank’s 
bought out shares, e) revalorization reserves, f) reserves from profit, g) profit, h) loss, i) 
remaining capital and j) total capital. 
 
 
In addition, the National Bank imposes other reporting requirements for banks as they are 
defined in the “Law on Monetary Transfers”:22 a) information about opened accounts of legal 
and private persons, which do business for a profit, b) cumulative information on turnover and 
balance of account according to the plan of the account for performing payment transfers 
from the charter of accounts established for the banks, c) information about the balance of 
resources on accounts of debtors which have unsettled obligations.  
 
                                                
21 “Regulations on the models and content of positions in the models of financial reports for banks and other 
financial organizations”, (Official Gazette of RS no 19/04) 
22 “Decision on the types of information that the banks deliver to the National Bank of Serbia and on the mode 
and deadlines for delivering this information”, (Official Gazette of RS no 111/03) 
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For the above reporting, the “Law on monetary transfers”23 defines banks as legal entities 
which are established as banks and do business according to the law which regulates banks 
and other financial institutions. Therefore, the other, above mentioned financial institutions 
have also to comply with this reporting requirement. 
 
 
C) Compulsory reserve  
 
The banks as well as other financial organizations, as defined in the Serbian Law on Banks, 
are obliged to keep a compulsory reserve with the National Bank of Serbia. The reserve is one 
of the basic NBS instruments for leading the macroeconomic policy. Banks find this 
requirement especially burdensome since the compulsory reserve can otherwise be used for 
the on-lending portfolio. This makes the loans more expensive and the cost is born by the 
clients. There are five types of the compulsory reserve. 
 
C.1. Dinar deposits reserve 
 
This reserve refers to liabilities arising from dinar deposits, dinar assets acquired through 
issues of securities and used dinar loans disbursed24. It is calculated using the rate of 21%, it 
is deducted in dinars by the bank and placed on the bank’s giro account25. 
 
C.2. Hard-currency deposits reserve 
 
This reserve refers to liabilities arising from hard currency deposits and hard currency loans, 
as well as other hard currency liabilities26. It is deducted by the bank in hard currency using 
the rate of 47% and placed on hard currency accounts of the NBS, either in Euros or USD27. 
The rationale for this reserve is security for the depositors. Banks object that as a result of this 
requirement, their on-lending portfolio is decreased for exactly 47%. They argue that by 
waiving this legislative requirement, their on-lending portfolio would be increased thus 
providing increased access to financial services. The NBS on the other side argues that 
microcredit is risky and therefore such a large deposit on savings is very much justified in 
order to protect the depositors. Hence, it is unlikely that the NBS will waive the 47% 
compulsory hard currency reserve in the near future 
 
C.3. Foreign credit lines reserve 
 
Until the end of 2004, the NBS regulations have excluded liabilities arising from foreign 
currency loans with foreign legal persons with contracted maturity exceeding four years, 
provided that such loan agreements, including any annexes to such agreements, were 
registered in line with regulations governing international credit relations.  
 
                                                
23 Article 10, point a) of the “Law on Monetary Transfers” (Official Gazette of RS no 43/04) 
24 Article 2, point 1 of the “Decision on the compulsory reserve of banks with the National Bank of Serbia”, 
(Official Gazette of RS no 136/04) 
25 Article 6, paragraph 1 Ibid. 
26 Article 2, paragraph 2 Ibid. 
27 Article 6, paragraph 2 Ibid. 
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In 2005, this provision has been cancelled, thus practically imposing the compulsory reserve 
on foreign credit lines until December 200428. This compulsory reserve amounts to 21% of 
the credit line and creates an additional impetus for microfinance development. 
 
C.4. Reserve on investments exceeding deposits 
 
Parts of deposits received under transactions that a bank performs in the name and on behalf 
of third persons exceeding the amount of investments from such deposits by the bank are also 
subject to the 21% compulsory reserve with the NBS29. 
 
C.5. Uncollateralized lending reserve 
 
Uncollateralized lending is regulated as a 100% liability of the bank. Thus the NBS imposes a 
100% reserve for uncollateralized lending 30 This means that if a bank issues a loan to a start-
up, there is a 100% physical reserve requested by the NBS. The rationale for this reserve is 
that start-ups usually have no collateral, no credit history and thus they are highly risky for 
banking. 
 
This legislative is a good example of how complicated it is to find one's way in the current 
Serbian banking legislation. Namely, although there is a valid "Law on Banks", and a 
"Decision on compulsory reserves with the NBS", this requirement is stipulated in the which 
gives instructions on how to calculate the banks' liquidity, the “Decision on detailed 
conditions for the application of articles 26 and 27 of the Law on banks and other financial 
organizations”. 
 
One of the options through which the 100% reserves on uncollateralized lending can be 
avoided, is imposing big administrative burdens on them. However, having in mind the 
practice so far, it is unlikely that this administrative burdens be regulated in the new banking 
law, but rather in decision of the NBS, all under condition that there is will to impose such 
administrative burdens. 
 
C.6. Liabilities exempt from the compulsory reserve 
 
The obligatory reserve is not calculated on the following31: 
1. Liabilities towards the NBS; 
2. Amount of obligations towards banks which deduct the compulsory reserve with the 
NBS; 
3. Liabilities on the basis of hard currency savings deposited with the banks after June 
30, 2001; 
4. Liabilities which arise from implementing the laws and other regulations governing 
the state public debt arising from the citizens’ hard currency savings of the citizens, 
deposits and special purpose deposits for the purchase and sale of bonds issued to 
service such public debt; 
5. Liabilities towards creditors of the Paris and London club; 
                                                
28 Article 3, paragraph 6 Ibid. 
29 Article 2, paragraph 3 Ibid. 
30 Article 14, paragraph 4 of the “Decision on detailed conditions for the application of articles 26 and 27 of the 
Law on banks and other financial organizations”, (Official Gazette of RS no 129/04) 
31 Article 3 of the “Decision on the compulsory reserve of banks with the National Bank of Serbia”, (Official 
Gazette of RS no 136/04) 
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C.7. NBS interest rate on the reserve 
 
The NBS does reimburse the banks with an interest rate for depositing this compulsory 
reserve, but the banks find in inadequately small. Namely, the interest rate for obligatory 
reserves in dinars is 35% of the discount rate,32 whereas the discount rate is established at 
8,5% annually.33 The NBS pays the interest rate in hard currency for the compulsory reserve 
in hard currency in USD and Euros which does not exceed the amount of the calculated hard 
currency compulsory reserve in the amount of 20% of the leading valid reference interest rate 
for USD and Euro34.  
 
 
 
As a comparison, the Central Bank of Montenegro imposes a compulsory 
reserve for deposits, using the rate of 23%.35 No compulsory reserves on 
foreign credit lines are imposed. 
 
 
 
D) Foreign exchange positions  
 
The foreign exchange position imposes a restriction of the open currency position and 
borrowing on a preferential rate from IFIs. 
 
In this case, consequently, the dinar lending is fixed to the exchange rate and the risk is borne 
by the borrowers. The fact the banks generally only engage in Dinar lending indexed to 
foreign currency shifts the exchange risk to customers and this means, that if borrowers are 
able to repay, a bank will have funds on hand to repay its foreign currency borrowing.  There 
are also other macroeconomic/foreign exchange-related reasons why the NBS still wants 
banks not to have large open currency positions, aside from the risk that the clients bearing 
the currency risk may not be able to repay if the Dinar drops sharply.  
 
 
E) Minimum Capital Requirements 
 
In order to prevent the mission drift, it is necessary that minimum capital requirements for 
MFI establishment are imposed. Such a requirement is necessary in order to prevent the 
misuse of MFI establishment for purposes other than aiding the working poor and general 
socio-economic development. The amount varies from case to case. For instance, the 
Grameen Foundation recommends “that the minimum capital requirements for MFIs should 
be realistic”36.  
 
                                                
32 Article 4 of the “Decision on interest rates of the National Bank of Serbia”, (Official Gazette of RS no 90/04) 
33 Article 1 of the “Decision on the amount of the discount rate of the National Bank of Serbia”, (Official Gazette 
of RS no 133/03) 
34 Article 5 of the “Decision on interest rates of the National Bank of Serbia”, (Official Gazette of RS no 90/04)  
35 “Decision on the compulsory reserve of banks with the Central Bank of Montenegro”, (Official Gazette of RM 
no 50/04) 
36 Counts Alex and Sobhan Sharmi, Grameen Foundation USA, 2002, “Recommendations for the Creation of a 
Pro-Microcredit Regulatory Framework”  
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So far the Serbian “Law on Banks and other Financial Institutions”37 foresees the following 
capital requirements: for Savings-Credit Cooperatives – 200.000 Euros, Savings-Credit 
Organizations 1.2 Mio Euros, for Savings Banks 2 Mio Euros  and for full-fledged Banks – 10 
Mio Euros. The Serbian Draft Law on MCOs proposed that the capital requirements for 
MCOs be capped at 100.000 Euros38. 
 
 
F) Minimum Capital Adequacy Requirements 
 
The minimum capital adequacy requirement defines the amount of capital in relation to the 
active at risk. Both Basel 1 and 2 Capital Accords foresee the amount of 8%. In determining 
the capital requirement basis, as defined, the NBS should follow, in general, the concepts of 
risk weighting for assets and off-balance sheet items as given in the 1988 International Capital 
Convergence Agreement made by bank supervisors (Basel 1 Capital Accord) but shall 
simplify or modify as it deems necessary for Serbia and may from time to time adjust such 
risk weightings as circumstances call for. As the supervisory authority, it is the responsibility 
of the National Bank of Serbia, to ensure minimum capital requirements for financial 
institutions and the on-going capital adequacy requirements for financial institutions. 
 
 
G) Tax incentives and policy and the financial sector 
 
Tax policy may bring adverse incentives to microfinance actors, and that is why proposals 
will not be made with regard to it .in this paper.39 
 
Generally speaking liberal tax policy has a very broad tax base but it can tax exempt certain 
types of activities. The argument for a liberal tax policy is that the state should bring in more 
tax revenues which places more money for development. 
 
Tax preferences from the economic perspective are always seen as a grant to an organization 
that does not have to pay tax, and its very market distorting. It is opposed by the likes of IMF 
and World Bank, EAR and other bilateral donors. One needs a very well reasoned and 
economically based argument why the market distorting effect of providing tax preferences is 
justified. The alternative would be to better to subsidize microfinance like in the US or UK, 
which set aside budgetary resources for community based microfinance. This would establish 
community development institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 “Law on Banks and other Financial Institutions” (Official Gazette of RS no 72/2003) 
38 The Serbian Draft “Law on Micro Credit Organizations” was made in February 2003 by the Serbian 
Microfinance Policy Working Group 
39 The enclosed is a summary of discussion with Tim Lyman 
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H) Barriers for the extension of credits and investment activities 
 
 
H.1. Additional measures for issuing consumer loans 
 
At the end of 2004, the NBS has introduced additional measures for issuing consumer loans. 
The NBS has considered that the public is becoming too indebted and decided to impose 
restrictions for banks on issuing loans. Namely, the new regulations impose a requirement for 
banks to take 15% r 20% down payments of the loan value before they issue a loan to the 
clients. 
 
H.2. Bank shares on the stock exchange market 
 
The Serbian banks are not listed on the Stock Exchange market so new investments can not 
enter the banks. According to the existing practice, banks are sold to one or two investors and 
thus closed companies are created.  
 
 
G) Collateral 
 
Issues relating to collateral significantly impede the microfinance industry development in 
Serbia. 
 
G.1. Registration of collateral 
 
The current Serbian legislation poses problems during the registration of collateral. Namely, a 
large number of real estate properties are not registered in the land registers and thus can not 
be pledged. Also, the court system foresees traveling from one city to another just to register 
collateral, which is consuming time-wise and also decreases the motivation. Thus, the time 
constraint is involved. 
 
G.2. Estimating the value of collateral 
 
The court approves the value of the assets when you pledge the collateral. When checking the 
value of assets pledged, the banks do not believe the court's statements, so they ask for more 
collateral. Sometimes, the value of collateral is even up to three times higher than the issued 
loan. 
 
G.3. Costs of pledging 
 
The costs of collateral registering are too high. The cost consists of the application cost, cost 
for certifying the contract and registering the right40. Having in mind the small amount of the 
micro loan, the costs of collateral pledging can constitute a significant part of the loan. The 
court taxes could be easily lowered as they are unfairly high for the microcredit clients, i.e. 
the registration of collateral takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes of work for the court. 
 
 
 
                                                
40 “Law on Court Taxes”, (Official Gazette of RS, no 29/04) 
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G.4. Central register of collateral 
 
There is no central register of collateral yet, although it is foreseen in the law. .This creates 
problems since on debtor can pledge the same collateral for more than one loan. 
 
Namely, the “Law on Registered Pledges on Movable Assets” 41 clearly stipulates that the 
Register of Pledges will be established to register pledges on the assets of individuals and 
legal entities. This Law also foresees that the  Register of Pledges will be centralized, 
containing a unique electronic database and that it will be publicly accessible. The Law also 
foresees that the Pledge Register will be managed by the authorized organization, which will 
be determined according to the law42. This is where the problem starts. 
 
The “Law on the Agency for Commercial Registers” is in charge for establishing the Register 
of Pledges43. It is supposed to run it together with the Register of Business Entities and the 
Financial Leasing Registry, along with other registers if they are established by the Law. 
However, the Register of Pledges has never been established, despite the legal obligation to 
do so, and thus one of the policy recommendations from this paper is to establish it since it 
would contribute to the development of the microfinance industry. 
 
In addition to the absence of the Central Register of Pledges, there is no central register of 
loans, so individuals may take several loans in different banks. The situation is a little better 
regarding when dealing with registered companies, since the bank has insight into the balance 
sheet and income statement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Article 56 of the “Law on Registered Pledges on Movable Assets”, (Official Gazette of RS, no 57/03) 
42 Article 57 Ibid. 
43 Article 4, paragraph 2 of the “Law on the Agency for Commercial Registers”, (Official Gazette of RS, no 
55/04)  
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V. Is commercial downscaling an option? 
 
 
• Downscaling has advantages and limitations 
 
• The question is how to institutionalize downscaling 
 
• Is the vehicle for microfinancing issuing microcredit to business through retail 
banking? 
 
 
A) Why downscale? 
 
Downscaling is the process of training economically viable commercial banks to specialize 
for micro loans. In this process, the banks retain their other functions such as deposit taking 
and commercial transactions. Also other bank departments continue with issuing loans 
exceeding micro loans which is especially useful when clients overcome the micro loan 
demand and migrate to small or medium loans. Downscaling is now being implemented in 
Serbia through KfW programs and LFS Financial Systems. The targeted banks are Eksim, 
Kulska, Komercijalna44 and Zepter bank. 
 
The question placed before bank management in the case of downscaling is why would a bank 
restructure itself to have a lower profit with a larger risk and less security? Below are the 
general reasons, as well as reasons adapted to the Serbian context: 
 
1) Risk diversification. The existing banks like to finance large clients since it brings high 
returns with a good security. However, if one large client becomes insolvent, perhaps 5%, 
10% or even 15% of the banks portfolio may be jeopardized. On the other side, if one micro 
client goes bust, only 0,000015 of the bank's portfolio is at risk. 
 
2) Downscaling opens new markets, since it attracts clients that otherwise would not come to 
the bank. 
 
3) Downscaling may also bring in a deposit base. 
 
4) When the client overgrows the micro loan category, he/she can migrate to another 
department, still remaining within the same bank45. 
 
5) Downscaled banks provide non-financial services46 to clients, which favors them with 
regard to the social mission of microfinance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Komercijalna bank is one of the rare big state owned banks which has remained in operation after the bank 
restructuring process has been implemented from 2001 to 2003. 
45 MFIs refer to these clients as “golden clients”. It their credit needs overgrow the MFI offer, they migrate to the 
formal banking sector. 
46 Generally, the cost structure impedes the providing of non-financial services portion necessary for the working 
poor since it makes the profits non-sustainable. 
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By providing non-financial services, downscaled banks attempt to prevent the social 
mission drift of bank: 1) Formulation of the business plan together with their clients, 
which can also serve as the credit analysis of the client; 2) Information on new 
legislation n order to maintain the portfolio quality. This is a favor for the clients, but 
also for the banks and their attempt to minimize the risk of credit default. 
 
 
6) As it is important that the general public has trust in the Serbian banking system, it is 
therefore necessary to work with the existing banks, both domestic and foreign. This will lead 
to an increased trust towards the banks and an increased stability of the banking system. 
 
 
B) The Serbian context 
 
Bank downscaling has been a big thing happening in microfinance in Serbia. This is 
interesting to correlate with global trends, as mainstream FFI downscaling is a very big deal. 
Littlefield47 found that worldwide "microfinance is melting into the financial sector": 
unregulated MFIs report to national credit bureaus, MFI clients access international ATM 
networks, MFI banks issue credit cards, there are 62 partnerships between banks and MFIs in 
36 countries, etc. So far in Serbia credit cards are mostly used for short-term consumer loans 
and not as a tool for microcredit.. 
 
Furthermore, Littlefield48 predicts that commercial and state banks will become core 
providers in building the financial services for the poor. This can be correlated to the latest 
initiative from the Serbian Ministry of Finance on establishing the Serbian Microcredit Fund. 
 
In Serbia, the NBS has restricted the establishment of Greenfield banks. The NBS says that if 
you wish to go into banking in Serbia, then you should buy one of the existing banks. The 
reason for such a position is that the State is the majority stakeholder in most of the Serbian 
banks, which has happened in 2002 after the "Decree on Debt to Equity Swap". In this 
process, as all the Serbian banks were largely indebted to the State and insolvent, that is 
unable to service their debt, the State converted its debt into equity and thus has become the 
majority stakeholder in most the Serbian banks. Now the State has a clear interest to sell its 
property as opposed to allowing the establishment of new Greenfield banks. Therefore, 
downscaling is for the time being a likely and plausible solution for microfinance banking. 
 
The consolidation of the banking sector is ongoing. Serbia has too many  banks compared to 
its population, i.e. in , 2003 Serbia had 46 banks on the population of 8 million, and in the 
beginning of 2005 it has 39 banks. The general trend of consolidation, as opposed to bank 
expansion, will continue in the future as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
47 CGAP, Littlefield Elizabeth, May 2004, “Building Financial Systems for the Poor”, Presentation at the MFC 
Conference, Warsaw, Poland 
48 CGAP, Littlefield Elizabeth, May 2004, “Building Financial Systems for the Poor”, Presentation at the MFC 
Conference, Warsaw, Poland 
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Lieberman49 mentions that the following factors could further facilitate 
downscaling in Serbia: 
? Technical assistance support to the bank 
? Equity or quasi equity investment in the bank 
? Long-term line of credit 
? Long-term subordinated loan 
? Education about microfinance 
 
 
 
An alternative approach for Greenfield investors is to purchase a bank to be privatized. 
Currently the state owned banks are being sold for the purpose of settling debts with the Paris 
and London Clubs of Debtors. 
 
 
 
Below are 7 parameters50 investors should consider when deciding to either 
downscale a commercially viable bank or start new, with a Greenfield bank: 
1. Initial Investment/Setup costs 
2. Training/Education effects n the staff 
3. Access for particular target groups of clients 
4. Efficiency of the bank 
5. Profitability 
6. Implementation of principles 
7. Internal control 
 
 
 
C. Is downscaling successful in Serbia? 
 
How has bank downscaling worked in Serbia? What are the legal and regulatory barriers that 
have caused it not to work better, and can any of those be proposed for a changed policy? 
 
 
C.1. Experience so far 
 
The banks involved in downscaling have found the following obstacles: 
 
1. For downscaling you need a lot of employees, as microcredit is labor intensive. This 
increases the cost structure of the loan. 
2. Follow-up of micro loans can be difficult (due to unduly repayment, improperly 
registered collateral etc.) For this purpose, the banks’ internal procedures should be 
adapted, under condition that there is a willingness to additionally train the staff. 
3. Security. Usually micro credit clients have none or insufficient collateral. In this case, 
it would help to know the clients’ credit history. By establishing the Centralized 
Register of Pledges 
                                                
49 Lieberman Ira, opinion based on comments to the downscaling process in Serbia 
50 Information on downscaling in Serbia was acquired with the assistance of LFS Financial Systems 
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4. Long duration of the execution procedure. In average it takes 1027 days in the Serbian 
courts to collect your debt51. There is a new Law on Execution, we will see in practice 
how will it protect the creditors. 
5. Disproportional value of the loan and collateral. The debtor pledges two or three times 
the value of the loan. In case of default in loan repayment, a disproportional value of 
collateral is to be sold.  
6. Repayment problems. The downscaled banks have started issuing consumer cash 
credits in the amount of one thousand euros. There have been significant problems in 
repayment, as the clients can take a credit in another bank. The solution to this 
problem would be establishing Client Dossiers.  
7. There are high costs for starting the court procedure for repayment. 
 
Also, the banks involved in the process of commercial downscaling have a different 
categorization of micro loans. For them, the average loan size of 10.000 which is the usual 
limit for microcredit categorization is increase for double, triple or even more times. 
 
Generally, the success of downscaling largely depends on the management team. If the 
management changes too often, the downscaling process is less successful, since new 
management needs to be trained continuously and presented with the advantages of 
downscaling. 
 
Although it has its advantages, downscaling can be a difficult job, due to the banks 
unwillingness to downscale, un-readiness of the staff to be trained etc. However, it largely 
depends on the bank which is chosen. 
 
 
C.2. Proposals for removal of legal and regulatory barriers 
 
Below are some proposals for a changed policy which would enhance downscaling. These 
proposals can also be applied to Greenfield banking, and explanations are given in the next 
chapter. 
 
1) Removing collateral pledging constraints, 
2) Decreasing the costly court registration taxes 
3) Introducing the Central register of pledges, maintained by the NBS 
4) Introducing Client’s dossiers for companies, entrepreneurs and individuals, 
maintained by the NBS 
5) Abolishing the compulsory reserve on foreign credit lines 
 
 
C.3. Interim alternative  
 
Within micro on-lending, we distinguish between consumer and business on-lending. The 
interim alternative is issuing microcredits for business through retail banking (up to 2.000 
Euros), as this would satisfy the NBS loan classification requirements. The consumer loans 
have less requirements then the loans for micro and small businesses. 
 
 
                                                
51 CLDS, December 2004, “Inefficiency and Corruption in Judiciary and Investment Climate in Serbia Building 
Poor”, WBI Investment Climate Program  
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1. The required documentation for issuing a consumer loan is minimal. 
2.   There are no balances, statutes, registrations of companies, etc., to be checked prior to 
issuing the consumer loan. 
3.  There is no checking whether the loan has been used for a specific purpose. 
4. Consequently, there is less work for the loan officers, which affects the cost structure. 
 
However, on the long run, it is questionable whether the downscaled commercial banks would 
institutionalize microfinance through issuing micro loans for business through retail banking. 
Also, the previous adverse results point out that this will not be a definitive alternative 
applicable for downscaled banks. 
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VI. The legal and regulatory obstacles to be removed 
to scale-up microfinance 
 
 
• There is a number or legal and regulatory obstacles to be removed in order to 
scale-up the microfinance industry 
 
• The topics should be addressed to predominantly to the NBS and the Ministry of 
Finance, but other actors should be involved as well 
 
 
The concluding part of this paper outlines the legal and regulatory changes advisable for 
scaling-up microfinance. Downscaling has been implemented with adverse effects in Serbia, 
due to a number of legal and regulatory barriers. The below are the proposals for a changed 
policy which would facilitate the microfinance industry development. 
 
 
 
I. Link microfinance scaling-up to bank restructuring and commercial bank 
downscaling 
 
 
Involve the same actors in the process, i.e., the National Bank of Serbia, Ministry of Finance, 
Bank Restructuring Agency, etc. 
 
 
II. Continue with commercial law reform 
 
Addressed: To all competent state authorities which are in charge of the commercial law 
reform 
 
 
Facilitate collateral registration: Due to the regional division of tasks, some courts are 
competent. As a result, debtors are required to travel from one city to another just to register 
collateral, which is consuming time-wise and also decreases the motivation. Ideally, the court 
system should be adapted. As this is not so likely in the near future, in order to solve this 
problem, the NBS establish a Central Register of pledges which would have branches in all of 
the major cities. 
 
 
Decrease the court taxes for registering collateral: The costs of collateral registering are too 
high. Having in mind the small amount of the micro loan, the costs of collateral pledging can 
constitute a significant part of the loan. The court taxes could be easily lowered as they are 
unfairly high for the microcredit clients, i.e. the registration of collateral takes approximately 
10 to 15 minutes of work for the court. 
 
 
Introduce the Central register of pledges: There is no central register of collateral yet, 
although it is foreseen in the law. This creates adverse incentives with the debtors, as they can 
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pledge the same collateral for more than one loan. The Central register of pledges should be 
operated and monitored by the NBS 
 
 
III. Lobby with NBS to facilitate microfinance 
 
Addressed: To the National Bank of Serbia 
 
 
Decrease the compulsory reserves with the NBS: The banks as well as other financial 
organizations, as defined in the Serbian Law on Banks, are obliged to keep a compulsory 
reserve with the National Bank of Serbia.  Banks find this requirement especially burdensome 
since the compulsory reserve can otherwise be used for the on-lending portfolio. This makes 
the loans more expensive and the cost is born by the clients. There are five types of the 
compulsory reserve. 
 
 
Alleviate foreign exchange positions: The foreign exchange position imposes a restriction of 
the open currency position and borrowing on a preferential rate from IFIs. In this case, 
consequently, the dinar lending is fixed to the exchange rate and the risk is borne by the 
borrowers. The fact the banks generally only engage in Dinar lending indexed to foreign 
currency shifts the exchange risk to customers and this means, that if borrowers are able to 
repay, a bank will have funds on hand to repay its foreign currency borrowing.   
 
 
Introduce Credit Dossiers for all debtors: companies, entrepreneurs, physical persons. There is 
no central register of loans, so individuals may take several loans in different banks, which 
creates problems in repayment. Also, the Credit Dossiers would provide information about the 
credit history of the debtors. The situation is slightly better regarding when dealing with 
registered companies, since the bank has insight into the balance sheet and income statement. 
The Credit Dossiers should be operated and monitored by the NBS 
 
 
IV. Adopt the new banking law 
 
Addressed: To the NBS and the Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Include provisions that would facilitate microfinance development in Serbia: Besides the 
above mentioned points addressed to the NBS, the new banking law should facilitate the 
reform of the banking sector, allow new foreign banks to enter the market with new 
investments and facilitate the restructuring / privatization of the existing state owned banks. 
 
 
List the Serbian banks on the Stock Exchange market: In this way new investments could 
enter the banks. According to the existing practice, banks are sold to one or two investors and 
thus closed companies are created. This is a proposal for the new banking law.  
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V. Adapt internal regulations in Downscaled Banks 
 
Addressed: To commercial banks in the process of downscaling 
 
 
Create a scoring system for clients’ loan applications: The scoring system would facilitate the 
work of loan officers and provide less arbitrary decision making on loan applications. It 
should be created through the banks’ internal regulations, using the banks’ policy as a 
guideline. 
 
 
Establish and review periodically internal procedures for granting credits and making 
investments: In order to establish an appropriate and properly controlled credit risk 
environment the following components should be included: A) Sound and well-documented 
credit granting and investment; B) Maintenance of an appropriate credit administration, 
measurement and ongoing monitoring/reporting process (including asset 
grading/classification): C) Ensure adequate controls over credit risk. This should be done 
through the banks’ internal by-laws. 
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